post and pre colonial nigeria

See discussions, stats, and author profiles for this publication at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/320127286 Between the Old and the New: Comparing the effectiveness of the pre-and postcolonial administrations in Nigeria’ Article · September 2017 CITATIONS 3 READS 8,796 1 author: Some of the authors of this publication are also working on these related projects: The Legislature and the challenge of accountability in Nigeria View project Omololu FAGBADEBO Durban University of Technology 32 PUBLICATIONS 104 CITATIONS SEE PROFILE All content following this page was uploaded by Omololu FAGBADEBO on 31 October 2017. The user has requested enhancement of the downloaded file. 148 BETWEEN THE OLD AND THE NEW: COMPARING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PRE-AND POST-COLONIAL ADMINISTRATIONS IN THE PROMOTION OF GOVERNANCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY IN NIGERIA Omololu Fagbadebo and Fayth Ruffin University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africe Fagbadebo@ukzn.ac.za ABSTRACT Recurring governance crisis has been associated with the Nigerian state since independence despite its oil wealth. Successive regimes have been tinkering with the nation’s resources in a manner that reduces the fortunes of the ordinary citizens in terms of welfare and good living. Personalised leadership style of the political elites dominates the political space with little regard for the welfare of the citizens. This article compared the effectiveness of the political arrangements in the pre-and post-colonial Nigeria. It discovered that the principles that guided the operations of politics in the pre-colonial era were more result-oriented. Leaders were more focused on the need for the promotion of the public good. Post-colonial leaders promoted personalisation of politics. Rather than harnessing extant constitutional powers to police the execution of public policies, public office holders, most especially the lawmakers, exploited their requisite oversight powers to negotiate for pecks and other pecuniary gains for personal benefits. The article concluded that the Nigerian state requires a purpose driven institutions of governance in a form of reinvention and rebranding of the principles associated with the pre-colonial political process and culture to curb the excessive use of executive power to promote impunity. Keywords: Colonialism, traditional, indigenous practice, pre-colonial, corruption. INTRODUCTION Very recently, the governor of one of the states in Nigeria sought for the introduction of the indigenous practice of governance with a view to curbing the rate of abuse of power by the Nigerian political office holders. Specifically, the governor, Chief Rochas Okorocha of Imo State, was interested in the possibility of fighting corruption through the application of pre-colonial traditional cultural values in governmental administration. We can fight corruption culturally in the sense that politicians should be made to swear with a deity into office. These deities don’t have mercy on anyone once you go contrary to its standard. The Bible and Koran are too merciful. That is why some of us do things without conscience knowing that God is merciful and forgiving (The Punch, March 2, 2017). As one of the major players in the contemporary Nigerian politics, Chief Okorocha is aware of the difference between the outputs of the governments in the pre-colonial and post-colonial periods. In other words, pre-colonial accountability measures were more effective in promoting good governance. By implication, BETWEEN THE OLD AND THE NEW: COMPARING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PRE-AND POST-COLONIAL ADMINISTRATIONS 149 the rampant cases of impunity in the contemporary Nigerian political practices are not effective; hence the burgeoning rise in governance crisis. Thus, the Nigerian public sees the political elites as self-seeking agents of the state. In one of its editorial comments, one of the Nigerian newspapers, The Guardian, states thus: We were and are still witnesses to the gradual loss of values at the family level, the increasing poor quality of education despite the prefixes and suffixes around the names of lawmakers, and the silence of local communities over graft and impropriety. True, the result is the cascading mediocrity that has percolated onto the sanctuary of law-making. As can be observed, it is not any alien who is destroying Nigeria but Nigerians themselves. By their shameless activities, these lawmakers are destroying Nigeria inside and outside (The Guardian, August 12, 2016). The admission of the loss of these values is an indication that there was a past that upheld the sanctity of accountability in political process; and that there is the need to reflect on good values of the ages with a view to reinvent a new path. In the pre-colonial societies, there were various accountability measures that checkmated the exercise of political power. In other words, there were multiple sources of political legitimacy that enforce accountability (Wiredu, 1997; Eze, 1997; Matolino, 2009). The pre-colonial African societies operated upon different political institutions (Ekeh, 1975; Wiredu, 1997; Ayittey, 2010). Yet, there is insufficient examination in the literature as to the rigor of governance in precolonial African societies and the lessons that can be drawn therefrom for incorporation into contemporary governance. This article helps fill this void in literature by comparing governing structures and processes in the pre- and postcolonial Nigeria to highlight how certain lessons from ancient Nigeria governance structures can be applied in the twenty-first century. This article is organised under six sections. This introductory section provides the basis for subsequent arguments. The second section provides briefs on the nature of administration in the pre-colonial era. Section three discusses how colonialism denigrated the pre-colonial African values of governance. This is followed by the discussion on the principles associated with the pre-colonial administration in Nigeria. Section five reviews the nature and characteristics of the contemporary Nigerian political elites, vis-à-vis their counterparts in the precolonial era. Section six presents and discusses data on governance crisis in Nigeria while section seven provides an exposition on the prospects for a new political pathway. Finally, section eight concludes with governance and political lessons learnt from Nigerian pre-colonial societies useful in overcoming present day shortcomings. GOVERNMENTAL ADMINISTRATION IN PRE-COLONIAL AFRICA The central focus of the governing systems in the pre-colonial African societies was the promotion of the public good. The societies were guided by the custom- 150 INDILINGA – AFRICAN JOURNAL OF INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS Vol 16 (1) 2017 ary rules of life with the absence of absolute rulership (Wiredu, 1997; Eze, 1997; Oelofsen, 2015). The concept of constitutionalism in the African context embodied the respect for the rules and customs commonly known by the people and any violation was met with the community reprisal (Williams, 1974; Wiredu, 1997). The lineage/kinship and age grade systems were the two prominent institutional structures upon which these constitutional principles operated (Williams, 1974; Chabal, 1992). Every society then was a network of kinsmen who descended from the same ancestors and everyone in the society belonged to a particular age grade at every point in time. These organised institutional structures functioned effectively as meeting points for decision making and avenues for leadership training and recruitment. Chancellor Williams identifies these institutions as functional political structures that characterised stability in the African societies. Williams (1974: 179) notes that the saying that ‘the king is supreme or has absolute power’ meant that ‘he has absolute power to carry out the will of the people’. Rulers could not exercise power in a manner contrary to the popular customary rules and norms. This was the basic principle that made it possible for the people to inflict punishment on any leader found to have abused his power. The precolonial African society was not characterised by corruption and abuse of power without a check. It was a near perfect society that upholds the principle of accountability (Igboin, 2016). The spirit of communality encouraged a passionate mode of interaction as every member of the community would not want to behave in a manner that would adversely affect the interest of the others. The indigenous religious beliefs and tradition served as the moral compass determining the behaviour of the people as well as the leaders. Traditional African religion expressed the beliefs in the potency of the guardianship of the ancestors in terms of the composition of the government as well as the administration of the activities of the society (Igboin, 2016). The palpable fear of regrettable repercussions of uncharitable behaviour served as the template for moral conduct among the citizens. COLONIALISM AND THE DENIGRATION OF THE TRADITIONAL VALUES OF ADMINISTRATIVE SYSTEM IN NIGERIA The advent of colonialism changed this rule. Some scholars have argued that the pre-colonial African society, with its norms and nuances, promoted the interest of the citizens, until the arrival of the colonial powers that introduced corruption (Hrituleac, 2011; Chabal, 1992). The argument is that colonial policies contaminated the moral values and virtues in the traditional African socio-cultural and political arrangement and culture (Hrituleac, 2011). Chabal (1992) notes that colonialism and independence interjected the growth and development of the budding indigenous knowledge systems of political accountability associated with the pre-colonial political process. He argues that BETWEEN THE OLD AND THE NEW: COMPARING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PRE-AND POST-COLONIAL ADMINISTRATIONS 151 these two epochal events in Africa evolved from ‘the rubbles of the previous political order (Chabal, 1992). In other words, the advent of colonialism marked the beginning of the destruction of the application of pre-colonial value systems of governance and accountability. The succeeding post-colonial political elites eliminated the remnants of the values retained by the colonial order. For instance, in the Eastern part of Nigeria, colonial deployment of warrant chiefs eliminated popular accountability (Kew, 2016). The indirect rule policy replaced the traditional leadership hierarchy with warrant chiefs who were charged to enforce the exploitative colonial policies and made answerable only to the colonial authority. This contradicted the traditional Ibo political structure ‘characterized by dispersed concentrations of power and overlapping networks of authority’ (Brown, 2011: 15). In this society, there was ‘a diffuse, hierarchical, acephalous government in which power was wielded by overlapping groups who all exercised small amounts of power within their spheres of influence’ (Brown, 2011: 15). The age grade leadership system abhorred the emergence of a single leader that wielded absolute power. This is similar to what was obtainable in the Ebira Community in the present day Kwara State of Nigeria (Kew, 2016). In the old Oyo Empire, there was a centralised administrative government under the leadership of the Alaafin who held a supreme religious and political authority (Kew, 2016). Nevertheless, this power was, in practice not absolute. There existed a carefully arranged checks and balance system with the Oyo Mesi, headed by the Bashorun, as the legislative arm of the administration. These traditional councils that enforced accountability ceased to function effectively when colonial administrations made use of the kings as administrative units under the purview of colonial supervision. The post-colonial political elite stripped the traditional rulers of their roles because they saw them as a threat to the power in the emerging governing system (Kew, 2016). Similarly, in the North, the centralised native administrative system was effective with an entrenched hegemony of the Sokoto Caliphate over the other towns (Kew, 2016). The Emirs, as the traditional rulers in the Northern Nigerians are called, enjoyed tremendous power in their domains. The advent of the British further strengthened this power and influence but made them to be subservient to the colonial officers who used them as fronts in the indirect rule policy (Kew, 2016). The enhanced power of the Northern traditional rulers continued till after independence. Subsequent political developments in the country effectively relegated such direct impact on local and national political spheres. PRINCIPLES AND PRACTICES ASSOCIATED WITH POLITICS IN THE PRECOLONIAL NIGERIA The contemporary Nigerian state is composed of societies with different precolonial state organisational structures. While some were centrally structured and organised, others were stateless societies. Kingdoms in the Yoruba, Hausa, Kanuri, Edo, Jukun were centralised states (Kew, 2016; Chabal, 1992; Mayowa 152 INDILINGA – AFRICAN JOURNAL OF INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS Vol 16 (1) 2017 2014). Societies that were mostly found in the Igbo, the Ibibio, the Annang, the Idoma and the Tiv communities in the present South Eastern and Middle Belt regions, were examples of stateless societies where there were no formal state organisations (Jacob, 2014). In both cases, democracy was consensus oriented, not majoritarian or liberal as in the case of present day democracies. The political structures of these communities may have specifically differed in composition and features but the overriding aim of uplifting and protecting community as a whole was constant. The outcomes were the prevalence of service delivery and the promotion of the collective welfare of the people. The ethos of governance during this period was guided by certain humanistic principles of living in harmony with nature. The first principle is that there was a striking balance between authority and power and service and accountability (Kew, 2016; Ayittey, 2010). Leaders were guided by the fact that the essence of power is for service delivery to the people. Leadership failure in terms of governance crisis was met with sanctions by the people in accordance to traditional norms and taboos (MAMSER, 1987). The power of the leader to rule depended on the goodwill and support from the people of the community. The exercise of power was not absolute; leaders were made to be accountable. The second principle was that the government operated based on consultation and consensus of the people (Ayittey, 2010; Akuul, 2010). Rulers were required to take into consideration the opinions of the people with the understanding that failure to respect the views of the subject could lead to crisis and overthrow of the leaders (Kew, 2016). The rulers derived their power and authority to rule from the people. The people expressed their displeasures against the ruler in different forms: withdrawal of chiefs from the palace, singing abusive songs against the ruler, women walking nakedly in the market place, refusal of the priests to perform important rituals, banishment or asking the king to commit suicide (Ayittey, 2010; Salami, 2006). For instance, in the Oyo Kingdom, the Oyo-Mesi and Ogboni Councils were the two political structures that checkmated the exercise of the power of the Alaafin, the king (Jacob, 2014; Mayowa, 2014; Akuul, 2010). The verdict of the two councils, led by the Bashorun and Olori Awo, respectively, against the king, was usually to protect the public interest. The system also had a mechanism to restrain an ambitious Bashorun from abusing his authority (Ayittey, 2010). Thus, each levels of the administration had a measure of accountability. The third principle is the understanding that the primary purpose of the state was the promotion of the welfare of the people. Even in cases of natural disaster like famine or failed harvest, the ruler usually carried the blame for such misfortunes, which, at times, could lead to forfeiture of the mandate to rule (MAMSER, 1987). In the old Junkun kingdom, for instance, the Aku Uka, the traditional ruler, could enjoy the support of the people in the exercise of his tyrannical power if harvests were good ‘but if harvest were bad, the people demands for his death’ (Mayowa, 2014: 21). BETWEEN THE OLD AND THE NEW: COMPARING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PRE-AND POST-COLONIAL ADMINISTRATIONS 153 The last principle relates to succession arrangements and the characteristics of the people that occupied political offices. In most of the centralised states, political offices were occupied by traditional rulers and limited to the identified ruling dynasties. Nevertheless, the choice of such rulers was guided by established and acceptable norms, rules and tradition (Ayittey, 2010; Akuul, 2010). Respect for accountability principles is lacking in the contemporary Nigerian state. Ekeh (1975) notes that the influx of the European values into the precolonial political institution polluted the traditional norms and values that once made politics more responsive to the yearnings of the public. He contends that the political elite of post-colonial African societies lack the ‘autonomy in the formation of values and in their decision-making processes, independent of external sources’ (Ekeh, 1975: 94). The implication of this is the dearth of the original values of the African culture in its political development. In other words, the nationalists, in their bid to succeed the departing colonial officials, compromised the traditional values and principles associated with political process and administration in the pre-colonial era. THE NATURE AND CHARACTERISTICS OF THE CONTEMPORARY NIGERIAN POLITICAL ELITES The political developments in the post-colonial Nigeria have not been a good story to tell (Sklar et al., 2006; Adebanwi and Obadare, 2011; Kirfodu, 2011). Ekeh (1975: 110) attributes this to the transition from the ‘primordial public’ to the ‘civic public’. The civic public was characterised by embezzlement of public funds, a development not acceptable in the primordial public. He notes that any leader who indulges in such in the primordial public may risk serious sanctions from members of his own primordial public if he seeks to extend the honesty and integrity with which he performs his duties in the primordial public to his duties in the civic public by employing universalistic criteria of impartiality (Ekeh, 1975: 110). Thus, the contemporary political elites depend largely on the public, and survive on state resources through the manipulation of state institutions (Kifordu, 2011). Richard Sklar and his colleagues aver that ‘Nigeria’s political titans vie for power and control over the vast spoils of office’ and ‘sit atop vast, pyramid-structured patronage networks based on regular “cash and carry” kickback relationships’ while over 70 percent of the people wallow in poverty (Sklar et al., 2006: 105). Likewise, Adebanwi and Obadare (2011) see Nigeria as a polity where political actors consecrate corruption while they engage in competitive thievery of public funds. The consequence of this is the prevalent of governance crisis. GOVERNANCE CRISIS IN THE CONTEMPORARY NIGERIA Constitutionally, each institution of the Nigerian government has specific responsibilities. The exercise of these responsibilities is the process by which policy is 154 INDILINGA – AFRICAN JOURNAL OF INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS Vol 16 (1) 2017 implemented and the needs of the population realized. Unfortunately, this is not the case in practice; and, this explains the abysmal global ratings of the country’s performance in all sectors based on the reality of the development indexes. Development index reports as shown in Tables 1, 2, and 3, place Nigeria among the countries that exhibit poor human development, poor governance indicators, poverty, high unemployment rates and corruption. Table 1: Nigeria’s Human Development Index (HDI) and Ranking, 1999-2014. Year HDI Rank 1999 0.456 146 2000 0.439 151 2001 0.455 136 2002 0.466 148 2003 0.463 152 2004 0.466 151 2005 0.466 158 2006 0.448 159 2007/2008 0.470 158 2009 0.425 158 2010 0.423 142 2011 0.459 156 2012 NA NA 2013 0.471 153 2014 0.504 152 Source: Compiled by authors from the available data produced by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) Human Development Reports for the period. Available at: www.undp.org/content/undp/en/hme/librarypage/hdr/ As shown in Table 1, Nigeria has, since 1999, consistently remained in the rank of countries displaying low indicators of human development. The Human Development Index (HDI) measures the capacity of the state to ‘create an enabling environment for people to enjoy long, healthy and creative lives’ (Human Development Report, 2013). A low HDR index is a threat to human security. Table 2: Nigeria’s Fragile/Failed State Index 2005-2015. Year Indicators Rank Total DP REF GG HF UED ECO SL PS HR SEC FE EXT 2005 7.2 3.0 6.5 8.7 8.9 5.8 8.8 6.9 6.7 9.0 8.3 4.5 54/76 84.3 2006 8.0 5.9 9.1 8.5 9.0 5.4 9.0 8.3 7.1 9.2 9.0 5.9 22/146 94.4 2007 8.2 5.6 9.5 8.5 9.1 5.4 9.1 8.7 7.1 9.2 9.5 5.7 17/177 95.6 2008 8.2 5.1 9.4 8.2 9.2 5.9 8.9 8.7 7.5 9.2 9.3 6.1 18/177 95.7 2009 8.5 5.3 9.7 8.3 9.5 6.6 9.2 9.0 8.6 9.4 9.6 6.1 15/177 99.8 2010 8.4 5.8 9.5 8.1 9.3 6.9 9.4 9.1 8.8 9.3 9.4 6.2 14/177 100.2 2011 8.3 6.0 9.6 7.7 9.0 7.3 9.0 9.0 8.6 9.1 9.5 6.9 14/177 99.9 2012 8.4 6.5 9.7 7.6 8.9 7.5 9.1 9.1 8.6 9.2 9.8 6.6 14/177 101.1 2013 8.5 6.6 9.8 7.0 9.2 7.3 8.8 9.3 8.6 9.5 9.4 6.3 16/178 100.7 2014 8.3 6.9 9.8 7.0 8.9 7.3 8.8 9.0 8.7 9.5 9.5 6.0 17/178 99.7 2015 8.8 7.5 9.9 7.1 8.8 7.6 9.1 9.1 8.8 9.9 9.8 6.0 14/178 102.4 Source: Compiled by author from the Failed/Fragile States Index Reports produced by The Fund for Peace. Available at: www.global.fundforpeace.org BETWEEN THE OLD AND THE NEW: COMPARING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PRE-AND POST-COLONIAL ADMINISTRATIONS 155 The Failed/Fragile States Index, as shown in Table 2, ranks Nigeria very low. The index measures twelve indicators divided into two categories: Social and Economic indicators and Political and Military Indicators. The social and economic indicators are demographic pressure (DP), refugees and IDP (REF), uneven economic development (UED), group grievances (GG), human rights and brain drain (HF) and poverty and economic decline (ECO). The political and military indicators are state legitimacy (SL), public services (PS), human rights and rule of law (HR), security apparatus (SEC), factionalized elites (FE), and external intervention (EXT). Nigeria’s position for the eleven years oscillates between high alert and alert category denoting the vulnerability of the people to socio-economic problems that engender a poor quality of life. Table 3: Nigeria’s Ibrahim Index of African Governance (IIGA) 2000-2015. Year Rank Score 2000 39 45.7 2001 NA NA 2002 41 46.2 2003 NA NA 2004 NA NA 2005 38 47.3 2006 39 48.5 2007 37 48.3 2008 35 45.5 2009 38 50.3 2010 40 43 2011 41 41 2012 43 42 2013 41 43.4 2014 37 45.8 2015 39 44.9 Source: Compiled by the authors from the IIAG Report produced by the MO Ibrahim Foundation. Available at: www.moibrahimfoundation.org The IIGA measures African governance based on four categories of issues divided into 14 other sub-categories and 93 indicators (MO Ibrahim Foundation, 2015). The safety and rule of law category is sub-divided into rule of law, accountability, personal safety and national security. The second category is that of participation and human rights, which comprises of participation, rights and gender. The third category, sustainable economic opportunity, is sub divided into public management, business environment infrastructure, and the rural sector. The fourth category is human development with welfare, education and health sub-categories. In all these indicators, Nigeria’s rating is very poor compared to the resources at the disposal of the political leadership. From the above data, it is evident that governance crisis in Nigeria since May 29, 2015 has not changed. Thus, the problem is not institutional failure; rather, the incapacity of the political elite to perform the requisite functions and responsibilities within the rules to make the institutions function effectively. Nigeria has abundant human and material resources capable of improving the quality of life 156 INDILINGA – AFRICAN JOURNAL OF INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS Vol 16 (1) 2017 of the citizens. Rather than transform this capacity into positive policy outcomes, the Nigerian state, ‘possesses many of the qualities associated with policy failure’ (LeVan, 2014: 3). PROSPECTS FOR A NEW POLITICAL PATHWAY The characteristics of the contemporary Nigerian leaders and the attendant consequences differ from the pre-colonial societies. The sense of national community was a prevailing virtue in the latter. The Nigerian state entered independent with a variegated value system that could not stimulate national consciousness in service delivery (Fagbadebo, 2016; Fagbadebo, 2007). Public accountability is, therefore, a rarity. In view of this, there is the need to develop multiple measures of accountability. There is the need for a legally mandated independent civil society groups or bodies to investigate any act of misconduct or abuse of power. The existing institutions of checks and balances in Nigeria are mere instruments for the promotion of the interests of the political elites (Fagbadebo, 2016). The fear of monitoring from non-partisan authorised independent bodies could induce the executive arm to abide by the rule of law in the exercise of power and help the legislature develop a non-partisan character in dealing with policy issues. This would create an atmosphere of responsible leadership with a view to entrenching a culture of accountability. This possibility is, however, dependent on the efficacy of the civil society. A politically conscious society is essential to checkmate the abuses associated with the exercise of powers. The civil society should be aware of the rights and responsibilities of members and be prepared to defend such in the face of any abuse. These rights include the power to choose political leaders under a free and fair electoral process. Aside from the above, it is pertinent to have a truly independent judiciary that will promote effective administration of justice. The judiciary should be truly independent of the executive and insulated from politics; and develop a culture of an impartial arbiter. This is what characterised most of the pre-colonial societies with respects to traditions, norms and values that held the people together. Public perception of political power has given rise to a series of abuse of power by the political elites. The political elites have equated accountability with the provision of personal needs to selected people for loyalty and electoral support. This has eroded the societal value of probity and accountability. Most, if not all, elected political elites won their elections through manipulation and electoral malpractices (Fagbadebo, 2016). CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS It is evident that traditional institutions and their occupants have lost their referred political relevance of the pre-colonial society due to the incursion of BETWEEN THE OLD AND THE NEW: COMPARING THE EFFECTIVENESS OF THE PRE-AND POST-COLONIAL ADMINISTRATIONS 157 colonial policies as well as the ambition of the post-colonial political elites. Gradually, the institution became enmeshed in the murky water of the Nigerian politics, a development that further denigrated its importance. The relative successes of the pre-colonial administration in accountability were facilitated by the attention given to the local governance institutions and structures. The local ethnic groups were homogenous and easy to manage. This article is not seeking for the wholesale adoption of the pre-colonial administrative mechanisms that promoted accountability. Rather, the advocacy is the adaptation of the principles associated with their practices into the present system. A blend of these principles with the modern institutional structures is important to cater for the needs of the people in the process of promoting the public goods. Colonial policies and activities destroyed the originality of these principles and made them instruments for the promotion of corruption and abuse of power. They are not obsolete. Ethnic-specific institutions would still have to play vital role as drivers of accountability. In this regard, effective decentralisation of governance structures with independent constitutional powers would be necessary to overcome the crisis of governance that have pervaded the country. Ethnic leaders operating with the milieu of their governing institutions will still be accorded considerable support, loyalty and popularity across the local people. Nigeria is a heterogeneous society with different local peculiarities. These local values should be integrated into the modern governing system with a view to ensuring stability amidst decentralised and differing governing structures. There is the need to rediscover the indigenous systems of political administration and explore its anti-corruption mechanisms. This would stimulate the promotion and inculcation of the indigenous values into the political psyche of the rulers and the ruled. 158 INDILINGA – AFRICAN JOURNAL OF INDIGENOUS KNOWLEDGE SYSTEMS Vol 16 (1) 2017 REFERENCES Adebanwi, W. and Obadare, E. (2011). When Corruption Fights Back: Democracy and Elite Interest in Nigeria's Anticorruption War. The Journal of Modern African Studies, 49: 185-213. Akuul T. (2010). Indigenous Democratic Norms and Values of Pre-Colonial Africa: Lessons for Contemporary Nigeria. Journal of Arts and Contemporary Society, 2: 37-45. Ayittey G.B.N. (2010). Traditional Institutions and the State of Accountability in Africa. 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