PAPER PRESENTATION ON: AN OVERVIEW ANALYSIS OF SUN TZU STRATEGIC ART OF WAR

BENUE STATE UNIVERSITY, MAKURDI

SCHOOL OF POSTGRADUATE STUDIES

FACULTY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE

LEVEL: 800

M.SC. INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS AND STRATEGIC STUDIES

NAME:

ECHEKWU EKUNU SUNDAY

PG NUMBER:

PG**** 08105383917

COURSE CODE:

IRSS 803

COURSE TITLE:

THEORY OF STRATEGIC STUDIES

COURSE LECTURER:

************

PAPER PRESENTATION ON: AN OVERVIEW ANALYSIS OF SUN TZU STRATEGIC ART OF WAR

DATE:

31 AUGUST, 2023.

Abstract and Figures

The Art of War by Sun Tzu, a landmark work in developing strategic thinking, had a profound and enduring impact on military strategy worldwide. Everyone from Cold War nuclear strategists to contemporary Chinese cyber warriors has adhered to its principles. His strategies for gaining a competitive advantage are so common and timeless that some of the most well-known figures in politics, economics, sports arts, and the entertainment industry all quote from its pages that are more than 2,500 years old. What then explains the prevalence of Chinese manuals on military strategy from 330 to 320 BC? in current military operations, business school curricula, sports, and popular culture? Sun Tsu imparts timeless knowledge to adapt to a changing environment and maximize rewards while reducing risk to stay current. Sun Tzu's techniques are especially applicable in the information age when conflicts and business grow more mental and less physical. This is because the human brain is becoming an increasingly important factor in competition. It does make sense for us to study a book that is so important to the philosophical history of China as the country grew stronger economically, militarily, and politically. This presentation explores how the leadership models presented in essential work have been used- and abused - in themilitary, politics and business.

Introduction

The Art of War was a book written by Sun Tzu during the year 610 BC. The authortried to provide the knowledge and skills on military strategies which could be across various fields and in the day to day activities of various groups of individuals. The targeted groups include those in the military, the businessmen and sportsmen. The book has gained popularity over the many years and has been used for various applications in the Western society (Tzu, p. 14). Sun Zi (Chinese: Sūn Zǐ; Wade-Giles: Sun Tzu) (c. 5– 496 B.C.E.) was a Chinese author of The Art of War an ancient Chinese classic on military strategy. He is also one of the earliest realists in international relations theory. According to a biography written about him in the second century B.C.E. by the historian Sima Qian, Sun Zi was a general who lived in the state of Wu. According to tradition, King Hel& of Wu hired Sun Zi as a general in approximately 512 B.C.E., after he finished his military treatise, the The Art of War. After he was hired, the kingdom of Wu, previously considered a semi-barbaric state, went on to become the greatest state of the Spring and Autumn period by conquering the powerful state of Chu. Sun Zi suddenly disappeared when King Helu finally conquered Chu, and the date of his death remains unknown.

CONCEPTUAL CLARIFICATIONS 

Sun Tzu is also known to have written the book, The Lost Art of War, which is related to the first book. He has been accepted as a historical figure of his time. He can also be considered as a politician since he ruled under the king a sa military general. Through his occupation, it would be correct to say that Tzu is in a position and is qualified to advice on military strategies and other related skills. The sources from which the author derives his ideas are very reliable since he talks out of experience. He was a qualified scholar who wrote a lot on military activities. He was also known to have had a successful career in military since he successfully applied his theories in war.

  War is an intense armed conflict between states, governments, societies, or paramilitary groups such as mercenaries, insurgents, and militias. It is generally characterized by extreme violence, destruction, and mortality, using regular or irregular military forces.

   An Act of war is an action by one country against another with an intention to provoke a war or an action that occurs during a declared war or armed conflict between military forces of any origin.

The book is organized into 13 chapters and has been described as a formal and logically written discourse on the subject of Chinese military. It was written during the 6th Century BC. It has since been translated into many languages but was first translated into the French language in 1782. Each chapter of the book gives a detailed explanation of a particular feature of warfare.

The earliest works on strategic thinking could be traced to Sun Tzu (500 BC) Who wrote:

"In peace prepare for war, in war prepare for peace. The art of war is of vital importance to the state. It is a matter of life and death. A road either to safety or ruin. Hence, it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected, Hence, it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise General who will use the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying, and thereby they achieve great results, Spies are a most important elements in war because upon them depends an army's ability to move, " Sun Tzu further argued that " The supreme act of war is to Subdue the enemy without fighting" The works of Sun Tzu was an obligatory reading in the former Soviet's political military hierarchy and has formed the basis source of all MAO TWe-Tung'S strategic and tactical doctrine.

BODY OF WORK 

KEYWORDS:

Life

The Art of War

Theory of Sun Tzu

Influence of Sun Z

INFLUENCE on Military Strategy

APPLICABILITY outside the military

RELEVANCE OF SUN TZU STRATEGIC THOUGHT ON THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD

Relevance  of  Sun  Tzu  on  Counter-insurgency  in  Nigeria 

The Xiii Art of War

Life

The name Sun Zi ("Master Sun") is an honorific title bestowed upon Sun Wu (Sūn Wǔ), the author's name. The character, wu, meaning "military," is the same as the character in wu shu, or martial art. Sun Wu also has a Chinese courtesy name, Chang Qing.

The only surviving source on the life of Sun Zi is the biography written in the second century B.C.E. by the historian Sima Qian, who describes him as a general who lived in the state of Wu in the sixth century B.C.E., and therefore a contemporary of one of the great Chinese thinkers of ancient times, Confucius. According to tradition, Sun Zi was a member of the landless Chinese aristocracy, the shi, descendants of nobility who had lost their dukedoms during the consolidation of the Spring and Autumn period. Unlike most shi, who were traveling academics, Sun Zi worked as a mercenary (similar to a modern military consultant)

According to tradition, King Hel& of Wu hired Sun Zi as a general in approximately 512 B.C.E., after he finished his military treatise, the The Art of War. After he was hired, the kingdom of Wu, previously considered a semi-barbaric state, went on to become the greatest state of the Spring and Autumn period by conquering the powerful state of Chu. Sun Zi suddenly disappeared when King Helu finally conquered Chu, and the date of his death remains unknown.

Sun Zi also is rumored to be an ancestor of Sun Jian, the founder of the Wu kingdom, which was one of the three competing dynasties during the Three Kingdoms era.

The Art of War

The beginning of The Art of War, in a bamboo book from the reign of the Qianlong emperor

The Chinese classic Ping-fa (The Art of War), the earliest known treatise on war and military science, is traditionally attributed to Sun Zi (personal name Sun Wu). It is likely, however, that it was written earlier in the Warring States period (475–221 B.C.E.), when China was divided into six or seven states that often resorted to war with each other in their struggles for supremacy.

Theory of Sun Tzu

Sun Zi stresses the unpredictability of battle, the use of flexible strategies and tactics, the importance of deception and surprise, the close relationship between politics and military policy, and the high costs of war. The futility of seeking hard and fast rules and the subtle paradoxes of success are major themes. The best battle, Sun Zi says, is the battle that is won without being fought.

Sun Zi laid down the essential rules of guerrilla tactics in The Art of War, advocating the use of deception and surprise to harass and demoralize the enemy until sufficient military strength was built up to defeat him in battle, or until political and military pressure caused him to seek peace.

"All warfare,” he said, “is based on deception. Hence, when able to attack, we must seem unable; when using our forces, we must seem inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe that we are far away; when far away, we must make him believe we are near. Hold out baits to entice the enemy. Feign disorder, and crush him."

The book's insistence on the close relationship between political considerations and military policy greatly influenced some modern strategists. Sun Zi's work is also one of the first to recommend the physical conditioning of armies prior to combat. He stated that physical training exercises should be basic in nature, with movements similar to today's jumping jacks and arm circles.

 Influences of Sun Zi (Sun Tzu)

Influence on Military Strategy

The Art of War has been one of the most popular works on military strategy in history. It is one of the most important collections of books in the Chinese literature, and was included in the ancient Chinese civil service examinations. In many East Asian countries, The Art of War was part of the syllabus for potential candidates of military service examinations.

During the Sengoku era in Japan, Takeda Shingen (1521-1573), a samurai lord, is said to have become almost invincible in all battles without relying on firearms because he studied The Art of War. The book was the inspiration for his famous battle standard "Fūrinkazan" (Wind, Forest, Fire and Mountain), meaning fast as wind, silent as forest, ferocious as fire and immovable as mountain.

The French translation may have influenced Napoleon, Leaders as diverse as Mao Zedong, General Pervez Musharraf, Vo Nguyen Giap, and General Douglas MacArthur have claimed to have drawn inspiration from the work. It is said that Mao and Josef Stalin both read this book while at war, and that Mao and the Chinese communists took many of the tactics from The Art of War that they utilized in fighting the Japanese and, later, the Chinese nationalists.

Applicability outside the military

Since at least the 1980s, The Art of War has been applied to many competitive endeavors that do not involve actual combat. The book has gained popularity in corporate culture; a number of business books have been written applying its lessons to "office politics" and corporate strategy. Many Japanese companies make the book required reading for their key corporate executives. The Art of War has also been applied, with much success, to business and managerial strategies.

The Art of War has aso been applied to political campaigns; Republican election strategist Lee Atwater claimed he traveled everywhere with it.

It has also found its way into sport: Australian cricket Coach John Buchanan handed out excerpts from the book to his players before a match against England in 2001, and the book is allegedly a favorite of University of South Carolina football head coach Steve Spurrier. Former Brazilian football coach, and current coach of the Portuguese national football team, Luiz Felipe Scolari, uses the book to plot his football strategy. In the 2002 FIFA World Cup he gave a copy to each of his players. In the recent 2006 FIFA World Cup in Germany he used the book to plan his team's win against England.

Impact of Sun Tzu's Strategic Thought on Contemporary Society

Sun Tzu's strategic thought is very significant to the contemporary world of today, scholars like Mark McNeilly writes in Sun Tzu and the Art of Modern Warfare that a modern interpretation of Sun and his importance throughout Chinese history is critical in understanding China's push to becoming a superpower in the twenty-first century.

Modern Chinese scholars explicitly rely on historical strategic lessons and The Art of War in developing their theories, seeing a direct relationship between their modern struggles and those of China in Sun Tzu's time.

The Art of War was introduced into Japan c. AD 760 and the book quickly became popular among Japanese generals. Through its later influence on the Sengoku period "Great Unifiers" of Japan, Oda Nobunaga, Toyotomi Hideyoshi, and Tokugawa leyasu, it significantly affected the unification of Japan. The Admiral of the Fleet T&gõ Heihachirõ, who led Japan's forces to victory in the Russo-Japanese War, was an avid reader of Sun Tzu. Ho Chi Minh translated the work for his Vietnamese officers to study. His general VõNguyên Giáp, the strategist behind victories over French and American forces in Vietnam, was likewise an avid student and practitioner of Sun Tzu's ideas.

Sun Tzu's Art of War has influenced many notable figures. The Chinese historian Sima Qian recounted that China's first historical emperor, Qin's Shi Huangdi, considered the book invaluable in ending the time of the Warring States. In the 20th century, the Chinese Communist leader Mao Zedong partially credited his 1949 victory over Chiang Kai-shek and the Kuomintang to The Art of War. The work strongly influenced Mao's writings about guerilla warfare, which further influenced communist insurgencies around the world.

America's Asian conflicts against Japan, North Korea, and North Vietnam brought Sun Tzu to the attention of American military leaders. The Department of the Army in the United States, through its Command 2nd General Staff College, has directed all units to maintain libraries within their respective headquarters for the continuing education of personnel in the war. The Art of War is mentioned as an example of works to be maintained at each facility, and staff duty officers are obliged to prepare short papers for presentation to other officers on their readings. Similarly, Sun Tzu's Art of War is listed on the Marine Corps Professional Reading Program. During the Gulf War in the 1990s, both Generals Norman Schwarzkopf Jr. and Colin Powell employed principles from Sun Tzu related to deception, speed, and striking one's enemy's weak points. However, the United

States and other Western countries have been criticised for not truly understanding Sun Tzu's work and not appreciating The Art of War within the wider context of Chinese society.

RELEVANCE OF SUN TZU ON COUNTER-INSURGENCY IN NIGERIA 

Deception and winning without fighting is the best skill. Sun Tzu has become the intellectual father of a school of warfare that advocates winning by maneuver or by psychologically dislocating the opponent. For example, Sun Tzu advocates attacking portions of the enemy with your whole force: “If I am able to determine the enemy’s dispositions while at the same time I conceal my own, then I can concentrate and he must divide. And if I concentrate while he divides, I can use my entire strength to attack a fraction of his”. Sun Tzu’s war fighting maxims span a wide range of strategic, operational, and tactical theories. From this list emerge several strategic underlying themes attacking the enemy’s strategy, knowledge of indirect approach, shaping the enemy, man’s role as the decisive factor in war, and the application of intelligence gathering activities. All these submissions have been adopted in 20th century warfare, and elaborated upon by modern thinkers in strategy decision making. From the  foregoing, the framework of analysis is a masterpiece in understanding the modus  operandi of  the insurgents from its structures and it influence on Nigerian state. The insurgency is more of terrorism in its tactics, which is not different from other major wars that occur in the history of mankind. However,  for  Nigerian state to deal  with the situation there is need to adopts Sun Tzu strategy of  not using much of military operations without thorough preparation rather  diplomacy  and  deception as means to conquer the enemy. Sun Tzu treats war (insurgency) just as one of the many political instruments that political and national leaders can use in order to fulfill political aims. For example, the  insurgency is good example  of  the political tool used by people  to  perpetrate  their  political  motives;  hence  if  the government is to overcome  this, the  counterinsurgency  strategy  of  Sun  Tzu  is  useful through negotiation and diplomatic strategy to curtail the upsurge of  insurgency in the country. On intelligence, the theory explains in details that, intelligence and information is very central for every counterinsurgency because it gives the security apparatus accurate information about the enemy(insurgents) and the success or otherwise is determine by the level of information disseminated. To this effect, in warfare, first lay plans which will ensure victory, and then lead your army to battle; if you will not begin with stratagem but rely on brute strength alone, victory will no longer be assured." As a matter of fact, this theoretical framework can be successful applied to analyze the war on insurgency in Nigeria. Indeed, studying. The Art of War can be a very efficient way insurgency in Nigeria, which represents “a model of Sun Tzu’s principles on indirect warfare”. However, to be more realistically, the defeat of insurgency is not entirely possible. This is because of structural injustice and failure of government to address the issue of unemployment, education and ethnic cleavages. In order to comply with the so-called ‘second paradox of Sun Tzu’ (obtaining success by preserving the enemy from total destruction), it should be noted that, “the object of war cannot be total security” but “a better kind of insecurity”. As for the case insurgency it means living Nigeria state without attempting to overthrow their political regimes, because the most dangerous peril would be to transform the war on insurgency into a war against Islam and resource control. However, it is not wrong to argue here that Sun Tzu’s  assertion  that a skillful strategist should be able to subdue the enemy’s army without engaging  it  is confusing if taken out of context. Sun Tzu was likely.

SUN TZU AND INTELLIGENCE THROUGHOUT 

The Art of War, Sun Tzu emphasizes the importance of information. According to Sun Tzu, all warfare, on the strategic and the tactical level, is based on deception and surprise, and therefore on intelligence (Sun Tzu, 1986). Sun Tzu argues that continuous use of information about the enemy’s strategy (political goal, possible alliances etc.)  and tactical capacities (number and types of troops, war machinery, resources etc.) is  the only effective way to exploit the enemy’s weaknesses, and should therefore form  the basis for all military planning (Sun Tzu, 1986). Critics have argued that Sun Tzu  relies excessively on intelligence, thereby making surprise and deception a panacea  (Handel,  2005). Plans that ensure victory require intelligence. Intelligence is about the enemy’s strengths, weaknesses, troop dispositions, morale, resources of men and material, strategic reserves, etc. In other words, knowledge is power and thus denial of information or intelligence is also a power.  The bulk of this  power is to be  exercised before battle is joined for it to lead to any meaningful success or victory. For Sun Tzu, the ideal victory is winning without fighting but using extensive deception, in order to convince the enemy’s forces to yield. Additionally, it may be asked whether Sun Tzu’s belief that reliable information is obtainable and can enable accurate forecasts (Handel, 2005) contradicts his idea of the infinite possible developments of  war, which was outlined above. However, the importance of intelligence in contemporary war should not be dismissed on these grounds. Intelligence, surprise and deception do play an important role in modern warfare. During the Persian Gulf War,  for example, Saddam Hussein’s loss of air reconnaissance allowed the US and  its  allies to successfully conduct deception tactics, which, in additional to the overall  supremacy of the US Army, played a role in the swift defeat of the Iranian military  forces (Finlan, 2003). Another insight provided by Sun Tzu’ thought on intelligence in regard to understanding contemporary war is more vague and indirect. Sun Tzu was aware of the fact that intelligence and information accumulation was a highly complex and difficult task. The chapter on the Use of Spies, where Sun Tzu writes about deception, counter-deception and the counter-measures corresponding to counter-deception, clearly reflects this complexity.  When one takes into account Sun Tzu’s empirical world, his thoughts on the complexity of information gathering can be seen in a more insightful light. Sun Tzu’s political world consisted of mainly two actors: Emperors of Chinese states, and barbarian rulers (Kane, 2007). The chapter on tactics indicates that the vast majority of direct military confrontation took place on the battlefield (Sun Tzu, 1986).  This is in contrast to the complexity of contemporary conflicts.  However, conflicts today often include  a great variety of actors, all with  different kinds of motives and strategies  (states, warlords, terrorists, security firms,  criminal organizations etc.), as well as different kinds of warfare (conventional  tactics,  guerilla  warfare,  terrorist  attacks  etc.).  Thus one must assume that the realization of adequate information is very difficult, if not impossible, to achieve.  Therefore,  Sun  Tzu’s  idea  of complexity of  information can  help  to explain  why  strong  states  misjudge  certain  situations and underestimate  the  political and military capacities of non-state actors, consequently applying inept strategies,  which cause them to lose asymmetrical conflicts. To this end, the role of intelligence  as a strategy, Hendel asserts that “Sun Tzu’s generals rely heavily on the work of  spies  and agents in order to secure victory with the least possible expenses and bloodshed”, suggesting that this aspect of warfare is one the most significant even for assuring an  effective deception. As a matter of fact, Sun Tzu wrote an entire chapter about  ‘Using  Spies’, in which he listed five different kinds of them (local, inward, converted,  doomed and surviving spies) and described their most important tasks and aims, such  as gaining the deepest and the widest knowledge of the enemy.  Similarly, Al-Qaeda has created “a highly sophisticated network of spies and human intelligence gathering sources throughout the world”. Such a system impressively resembles to the one suggested by Sun Tzu given that, as Gunaratna reports, it is comprised of three different levels of spies: “two tiers of agents who manage agents outside Afghanistan and in the regional nodes. They also cultivate subagents whose primary responsibility is penetrating and infiltrating Muslim migrant communities to recruit, gather intelligence and conduct operations.” As a matter of fact, International Terrorist Association (ITA)  like Al-Qaeda employs three conceptual pillars which characterize the thought  of warfare proposed by Sun Tzu: deception, psychological considerations and the role  of intelligence. Deception and psychological factors are the heart of warfare because they allow manipulating the enemy’s perceptions. Indeed, Sun Tzu perfectly knew that enemies convinced of their superiority in terms of capabilities or military resources weren’t attentive to the possibility of being misled.  In the same way, Al-Qaeda  might appear weak or not well-organized  but being an international network with links in 55 countries and having training camps in many of  them, its organizational structure is  “such that deception, misdirection, secrecy and compartmentalization are heightened”  and exploited extensively and successfully. In addition, psychological warfare is the direct consequence of deception: attacking enemy soldiers and their related citizens through indirect methods is the best way to destroy their morale and create tension inside society. Al Qaeda’s tactics are in  line  with  Sun  Tzu’s  recommendation,  its main objective is spreading fear striking target’s societies  through  bombing,  hijacking,  kidnapping, assassinations and  suicide  attacks.  Doing  so,  Al-Qaeda  aims to undermine the overall support for the war effort, the sense of security among  citizens and, moreover, it is successful in avoiding an open and unbalanced combat  with the US.

The Xiii Art of War 

By Sun Tzu 

Translated by Lionel Giles

Laying Plans 

Sun Tzu said: The art of war is of vital importance to the State. 

It is a matter of life and death, a road either to safety or to ruin. Hence it is a subject of inquiry which can on no account be neglected. 

The art of war, then, is governed by five constant factors, to be taken into account in one's deliberations, when seeking to determine the conditions obtaining in the field. 

These are: (1) The Moral Law; (2) Heaven; (3) Earth; (4) The Commander; (5) Method and discipline. 

II. Waging War 

1. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers, with provisions enough to carry them a thousand, the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men. 

2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then men's weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength. 

3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain. 

4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue. 

5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays. 

6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare. 

III. Attack by Stratagem 

1. Sun Tzu said: In the practical art of war, the best thing of all is to take the enemy's country whole and intact; to shatter and destroy it is not so good. So, too, it is better to recapture an army entire than to destroy it, to capture a regiment, a detachment or a company entire than to destroy them. 

2. Hence to fight and conquer in all your battles is not supreme excellence; supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy's resistance without fighting. 

3. Thus the highest form of generalship is to balk the enemy's plans; the next best is to prevent the junction of the enemy's forces; the next in order is to attack the enemy's army in the field; and the worst policy of all is to besiege walled cities. 

4. The rule is, not to besiege walled cities if it can possibly be avoided. The preparation of mantlets, movable shelters, and various implements of war, will take up three whole months; and the piling up of mounds over against the walls will take three months more. 

5. The general, unable to control his irritation, will launch his men to the assault like swarming ants, with the result that one-third of his men are slain, while the town still remains untaken. Such are the disastrous effects of a siege. 

IV. Tactical Dispositions 

1. Sun Tzu said: The good fighters of old first put themselves beyond the possibility of defeat, and then waited for an opportunity of defeating the enemy. 

2. To secure ourselves against defeat lies in our own hands, but the opportunity of defeating the enemy is provided by the enemy himself. 

3. Thus the good fighter is able to secure himself against defeat, but cannot make certain of defeating the enemy. 

4. Hence the saying: One may know how to conquer without being able to do it. 

5. Security against defeat implies defensive tactics; ability to defeat the enemy means taking the offensive. 

6. Standing on the defensive indicates insufficient strength; attacking, a superabundance of strength. 

7. The general who is skilled in defense hides in the most secret recesses of the earth; he who is skilled in attack flashes forth from the topmost heights of heaven. Thus on the one hand we have ability to protect ourselves; on the other, a victory that is complete. 

V. Energy 

Sun Tzu said: The control of a large force is the same principle as the control of a few men: it is merely a question of dividing up their numbers. 

Fighting with a large army under your command is nowise different from fighting with a small one: it is merely a question of instituting signs and signals. 

To ensure that your whole host may withstand the brunt of the enemy's attack and remain unshaken-- this is affected by maneuvers direct and indirect. 

That the impact of your army may be like a grindstone dashed against an egg--this is effected by the science of weak points and strong. 

In all fighting, the direct method may be used for joining battle, but indirect methods will be needed in order to secure victory. 

Indirect tactics, efficiently applied, are inexhaustible as Heaven and Earth, unending as the flow of rivers and streams; like the sun and moon, they end but to begin anew; like the four seasons, they pass away to return once more. 

VI. Weak Points and Strong 

Sun Tzu said: Whoever is first in the field and awaits the coming of the enemy, will be fresh for the fight; whoever is second in the field and has to hasten to battle will arrive exhausted. 

Therefore the clever combatant imposes his will on the enemy, but does not allow the enemy's will to be imposed on him. 

By holding out advantages to him, he can cause the enemy to approach of his own accord; or, by inflicting damage, he can make it impossible for the enemy to draw near. 

If the enemy is taking his ease, he can harass him; if well supplied with food, he can starve him out; if quietly encamped, he can force him to move. 

Appear at points which the enemy must hasten to defend; march swiftly to places where you are not expected. 

An army may march great distances without distress, if it marches through country where the enemy is not. 

VII. Maneuvering 

Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign. 

Having collected an army and concentrated his forces, he must blend and harmonize the different elements thereof before pitching his camp. 

After that, comes tactical maneuvering, than which there is nothing more difficult. The difficulty of tactical maneuvering consists in turning the devious into the direct, and misfortune into gain. 

Thus, to take a long and circuitous route, after enticing the enemy out of the way, and though starting after him, to contrive to reach the goal before him, shows knowledge of the artifice of deviation. 

VIII. Variation in Tactics 

Sun Tzu said: In war, the general receives his commands from the sovereign, collects his army and concentrates his forces 

When in difficult country, do not encamp. In country where high roads intersect, join hands with your allies. Do not linger in dangerously isolated positions. In hemmed-in situations, you must resort to stratagem. In desperate position, you must fight. 

There are roads which must not be followed, armies which must be not attacked, towns which must be besieged, positions which must not be contested, and commands of the sovereign which must not be obeyed. 

The general who thoroughly understands the advantages that accompany variation of tactics knows how to handle his troops. 

The general who does not understand these, may be well acquainted with the configuration of the country, yet he will not be able to turn his knowledge to practical account. 

IX. The Army on the March 

Sun Tzu said: We come now to the question of encamping the army, and observing signs of the enemy. Pass quickly over mountains, and keep in the neighborhood of valleys. 

Camp in high places, facing the sun. Do not climb heights in order to fight. So much for mountain warfare.

After crossing a river, you should get far away from it. 

When an invading force crosses a river in its onward march, do not advance to meet it in mid-stream. It will be best to let half the army get across, and then deliver your attack. 

 If you are anxious to fight, you should not go to meet the invader near a river which he has to cross. 

X. Terrain 

Sun Tzu said: We may distinguish six kinds of terrain, to wit: (i) Accessible ground; (ii) entangling ground; (iii) temporizing ground; (iv) narrow passes; (v) precipitous heights; (vi) positions at a great distance from the enemy. 

Ground which can be freely traversed by both sides is called accessible. 

With regard to ground of this nature, be before the enemy in occupying the raised and sunny spots, and carefully guard your line of supplies. Then you will be able to fight with advantage. 

Ground which can be abandoned but is hard to re-occupy is called entangling. 

From a position of this sort, if the enemy is unprepared, you may sally forth and defeat him. But if the enemy is prepared for your coming, and you fail to defeat him, then, return being impossible, disaster will ensue. 

XI. The Nine Situations 

Sun Tzu said: The art of war recognizes nine varieties of ground: (i) Dispersive ground; (ii) facile ground; (iii) contentious ground; (iv) open ground; (v) ground of intersecting highways; (vi) serious ground; (vii) difficult ground; (viii) hemmed-in ground; (x) desperate ground. 

When a chieftain is fighting in his own territory, it is dispersive ground. 

When he has penetrated into hostile territory, but to no great distance, it is facile ground. 

Ground the possession of which imports great advantage to either side, is contentious ground. 

Ground on which each side has liberty of movement is open ground. 

XII. The Attack by Fire 

Sun Tzu said: There are five ways of attacking with fire. The first is to burn soldiers in their camp; the second is to burn stores; the third is to burn baggage trains; the fourth is to burn arsenals and magazines; the fifth is to hurl dropping fire amongst the enemy. 

In order to carry out an attack, we must have means available. The material for raising fire should always be kept in readiness. 

There is a proper season for making attacks with fire, and special days for starting a conflagration. 

The proper season is when the weather is very dry; the special days are those when the moon is in the constellations of the Sieve, the Wall, the Wing or the Cross-bar; for these four are all days of rising wind. 

In attacking with fire, one should be prepared to meet five possible developments: 

XIII. The Use of Spies 

Sun Tzu said: Raising a host of a hundred thousand men and marching them great distances entails heavy loss on the people and a drain on the resources of the State. The daily expenditure will amount to a thousand ounces of silver. There will be commotion at home and abroad, and men will drop down exhausted on the highways. As many as seven hundred thousand families will be impeded in their labor. 

Hostile armies may face each other for years, striving for the victory which is decided in a single day. This being so, to remain in ignorance of the enemy's condition simply because one grudges the outlay of a hundred ounces of silver in honors and emoluments, is the height of inhumanity. 

One who acts thus is no leader of men, no present help to his sovereign, no master of victory. 

Thus, what enables the wise sovereign and the good general to strike and conquer, and achieve things beyond the reach of ordinary men, is foreknowledge. 

Now this foreknowledge cannot be elicited from spirits; it cannot be obtained inductively from experience, nor by any deductive calculation. 

 Knowledge of the enemy's dispositions can only be obtained from other men.

Hence the use of spies, of whom there are five classes: (i) Local spies; (ii) inward spies; (iii) converted spies; (iv) doomed spies; (v) surviving spies. 

When these five kinds of spy are all at work, none can discover the secret system. This is called "divine manipulation of the threads." It is the sovereign's most precious faculty.

 Having local spies means employing the services of the inhabitants of a district. 

Having inward spies, making use of officials of the enemy. 

Having converted spies, getting hold of the enemy's spies and using them for our own purposes. 

Having doomed spies, doing certain things openly for purposes of deception, and allowing our spies to know of them and report them to the enemy. 

Surviving spies, finally, are those who bring back news from the enemy's camp. 

Hence it is that which none in the whole army are more intimate relations to be maintained than with spies. None should be more liberally rewarded. In no other business should greater secrecy be preserved. 

Spies cannot be usefully employed without a certain intuitive sagacity. 

They cannot be properly managed without benevolence and straightforwardness. 

Without subtle ingenuity of mind, one cannot make certain of the truth of their reports. 

Be subtle! be subtle! and use your spies for every kind of business. 

If a secret piece of news is divulged by a spy before the time is ripe, he must be put to death together with the man to whom the secret was told. 

Whether the object be to crush an army, to storm a city, or to assassinate an individual, it is always necessary to begin by finding out the names of the attendants, the aides-de-camp, and door-keepers and sentries of the general in command. Our spies must be commissioned to ascertain these. 

The enemy's spies who have come to spy on us must be sought out, tempted with bribes, led away and comfortably housed. Thus they will become converted spies and available for our service. 

It is through the information brought by the converted spy that we are able to acquire and employ local and inward spies. 

It is owing to his information, again, that we can cause the doomed spy to carry false tidings to the enemy. 

Lastly, it is by his information that the surviving spy can be used on appointed occasions. 

The end and aim of spying in all its five varieties is knowledge of the enemy; and this knowledge can only be derived, in the first instance, from the converted spy. Hence it is essential that the converted spy be treated with the utmost liberality.

Of old, the rise of the Yin dynasty was due to I Chih who had served under the Hsia. Likewise, the rise of the Chou dynasty was due to Lu Ya who had served under the Yin. 

Hence it is only the enlightened ruler and the wise general who will use the highest intelligence of the army for purposes of spying and thereby they achieve great results. Spies are a most important element in water, because on them depends an army's ability to move.

CONCLUSION

Art of War is known to have been consulted by the warlord Cao Cao (l. 155-220 CE), one of the generals who tried to win the throne when the Han Dynasty was in decline. Cao Cao wrote a commentary on the work, establishing its importance at that time, but was no doubt known to the nobles who engaged in the War of the Eight Princes (291-306 CE), each of whom waged war on each other according to Sun-Tzu's precepts. Cao Cao's defeat at the Battle of Red Cliffs (208 CE) resulted in the division of the Three Kingdoms Period (220-280 CE) which established separate kingdoms all led by former generals who had used Sun-Tzu's work.

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